Two of the fundamental problems of control systems theory are controllability and observability, and designing control systems so that these properties can be satisfied or approximated sufficiently. However, it is prudent to assume that attackers will not only be able to subvert measurements but also control. Moreover, advanced adversaries with an understanding of the control system may seek to take over control of the entire system or parts thereof, or deny the legitimate operator this capability; the effectiveness of such attacks has been demonstrated in previous work. Therefore, we argue that such attacks cannot be ruled out entirely given the likely existence of unknown vulnerabilities, increasing connectivity of nominally air-gapped systems, and even supply chain issues. The ability to rapidly recover control after an attack has been initiated or the detection of an adversary's presence is therefore critical. In this paper we study the problem of structural controllability that has recently re-gained substantial attention through the equivalent problem of the Power Dominating Set introduced by Haynes in the context of electrical power network control. However, these problems are known to be N P-hard with poor approximability. Given their relevance to many networks, especially for power networks, we study strategies for the efficient restoration of
Introduction
Domination, a central topic in graph theory, becomes a relevant theme in the design and analysis of control systems as it is an equivalent problem to that of (Kalman) controllability. This motivation focuses on the the concept of structural controllability introduced by Lin in [1] , which is based on the control theory as defined by Kalman in [2] :
x(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t), x(t 0 ) = x 0
In this formulation, x(t) is a vector (x 1 (t), . . . , x n (t)) T representing the current state of a system with n nodes at time t; A is an adjacency matrix n × n giving the network topology that identifies interaction between nodes, B an input matrix n × m, where m ≤ n, identifies the set of nodes controlled by a time-dependent input vector u(t) = (u 1 (t), . . . , u m (t)) which forces the system to a desired state in a finite number of steps. The system in Equation 1 is controllable if and only if rank[B, AB, A 2 B, . . . , A n−1 B] = n (Kalman's rank criterion). However, this formulation is quite restrictive for large networks (e.g., the control of power networks or similarly large control systems) where there exists an exponential growth of input values as a function of nodes. This is the main reason that our investigations concentrate on structural controllability, where matrix A of Equation 1 represents the network topology, and matrix B contains the set of nodes with the capacity to drive control [3] .
C. Lin also gives the interpretation of G(A, B) = (V, E) as a digraph where V = V A ∪ V B the set of vertices and E = E A ∪ E B the set of edges. In this representation, V B comprises those nodes capable of injecting control signals into the entire network, also known as driver nodes (denoted as n d ) corresponding to input vector u in Equation 1 . The identification of these nodes has so far been studied in relation to general networks; in this paper we principally concentrate on those power-law networks, most pertinent to a number of largescale infrastructure networks. To identify minimum driver node subsets N D , we follow the approach based on the Power Dominating Set (PDS) problem which is described in more detail in [4, 5] . This interest is primarily because PDS-based networks have similar logical structures as real-world monitoring systems, where driver nodes can represent, for example, remote terminal units that control industrial sensors or actuators. In fact, the PDS problem was originally introduced as an extension of the Dominating Set (DS) by Haynes et al. [6] , mainly motivated by the structure of electric power networks and the need for the efficient 'monitoring' of such networks.
Building on previous work done [4, 5] , we propose in this paper several restoration heuristics (strategies) for the control of a network once that N D has been perturbed. Different attack patterns compromising nodes and their effects have already been analysed extensively in [4, 5] , analysing and evaluating interactive and non-interactive attacks, including multiple rounds between attackers and defenders, respectively. However, it is clearly undesirable to restore overall controllability through complete re-computation if the PDS properties have only become partially violated -where this is possible given the constraints imposed by compromised nodes -as the PDS problem is known to be N P-complete for general graphs as well as for bipartite and chordal graphs as shown by Haynes et al. in [6] . Subsequent research by Guo et al. extended N P-completeness proofs for planar, circle, and split graphs [7] , with the exception of partial k-tree graphs with k ≥ 1 and parametrised using N D , in which the DS and PDS problems can become tractable in linear-time, while the parametrised intractability can result in W [2]-hardness [8] . Pai et al. have also provided some recent results in grid graphs [9] , whilst Atkins et al. have studied block graphs [10] . There are other approaches that address the topic of PDS for specific cases [11, 12] , but none of them focus on efficient solutions for the restoration of the PDS problem following perturbations, i.e., where a PDS of the original graph G is known alongside the changes induced on G.
The restoration strategies defined in this paper center on general power-law and scale-free distributions by offering similar characteristics to real power networks. In particular, we define three strategies for determining the complexity of restoration. To evaluate the complexity, we consider: (i) A strategy without any type of constraint for restoration; (ii) another one based on the graph diameter to minimise the intrinsic problem of the non-locality of PDS; and (iii) a strategy based on backup instances of driver nodes. We show that this offers a gain in efficiency over re-computation whilst resulting in acceptable deviations from an optimal (i.e., minimal |N D |) PDS. As many critical infrastructures require timely or even real-time bounded restoration to ensure resilience and continued operation, the ability to restore controllability rapidly is essential.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the initial conditions and assumptions for perturbation and restoration in order to then introduce the tree restoration strategies in Section 3. In Section 4 we evaluate the additional complexities, and we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each approach. Finally, our conclusions together with future work are given in Section 5.
Conditions for the Analysis
In this section we discuss the initial assumptions and conditions used to restore the structural controllability when nodes are being attacked from within a network, including a simple graph model. Let G(V, E) be a directed acyclic graph (DAG) based on an arbitrary set of nodes V and a set of edges E, where each vertex v i ∈ V can be linked to other v j ∈ V such that (v i , v j ) ∈ E, without producing loops or self-loops (i.e., v i = v j ).
Assumptions for Perturbation
The first assumption we consider here is that one or several vertices can be targeted by one or several attackers, knowing the structure or probability distribution of edges of the graph, its topology, and the identities of the current driver nodes N D (note that N D is not necessarily unique). Those driver nodes that also belong to V satisfy the two observation rules for controllability, which were simplified by Kneis et al. in [13] from the original formulation specified by Haynes et al. in [6] . Both rules and their algorithms are detailed in [4, 5] , and below:
OR1 A vertex in N D observes itself and all its neighbours.
OR2
If an observed vertex v of degree d ≥ 2 is adjacent to d − 1 observed vertices, the remaining unobserved vertex becomes observed as well.
Note that the omission of OR2 already results in the N P-complete DS problem, with a polynomial-time approximation factor of Θ(log n) [14] . The following condition is that the construction of N D is arbitrary and depends on the selection of vertices satisfying OR1, allowing the customisable selection of controllability generation strategies as specified in [4] . Once the N D has been obtained, we evaluate two different scenarios concentrating on attacks against either node or edge (communication link) availability [4, 5] :
SCN-1 Randomly remove some (not all) edges of one or several vertices, which may compromise controllability of dependent nodes or disconnect parts of the control graph and underlying network.
SCN-2
Randomly isolate one or several vertices from the network by intentionally deleting all their links (i.e., this attack may result in the complete isolation of nodes from the network).
As detailed in [4, 5] , either attack scenario may result in a degradation of the control of the network and a significant reduction of its observability (including partial observability). To address this aspect, we identify two classes of nodes:
The node u is not observed by a n d , but belongs to N D and it is part of the control node set.
U-2
The node u is not observed by a n d and it does not belong to N D . This means that u is part of the set of observed nodes, denoted as O, such that
When such a node is not being observed by a member ∈ N D , the set of unobserved nodes U has to be updated so that each node u ∈ U can be again observed by at least one member of N D .
Assumptions for Restoration
We assume that the restoration of structural controllability N D is initially based on searching driver nodes ∈ N D which offer coverage of unobserved nodes ∈ U with dependence on attacked nodes ∈ A. The term coverage here refers to the ability of a new link to be established between the best candidate ∈ N D and an unobserved node ∈ U such that the two observation rules OR1 and OR2 are satisfied. For this, the candidates for restoring the controllability must comply the following properties:
1. Satisfy the conditions of OR1; i.e., select a n d ∈ N D capable of observing itself and an unobserved u ∈ U through a new link (
2. None of the new restoration links must violate the out-degree distribution of a power-law network and must not introduce cycles.
3. Satisfy the conditions of OR2; i.e., verify that
OR2 is not infringed. This can involve the inclusion of one or several new members in
At the end of the algorithm, the restored set N D can increase the initial number of driver nodes such that U = (note that | N D |=| V | in degenerate cases). However, and unfortunately, we must also consider the handicap of non-locality of PDS and the N P-Complete demonstrated by Haynes et al. [6] .
Our heuristic approach is based on ensuring that the hard constraints, i.e., observation rules, are satisfied primarily, and that as a secondary constraint the out-degree distribution property of the underlying power-law network remains unaltered. This strategy also depends on the approaches taken for each restoration strategy defined in the remainder of the paper. In this case, our studies are based on two main approaches:
APPR-1 Find a n d ∈ N D to re-link it to an unobserved node u ∈ U .
APPR-2 Find a n d bl belonging to a backup list of driver nodes such that there is an edge between n d bl and unobserved node u ∈ U .
Likewise, each restoration strategy has to consider some of the following "restoration rules" (heuristics) defined by us:
RR1 If u is a U-1, then we ensure that u still satisfies OR1.
RR2 If u is a U-2, and the restoration strategy follows the APPR-1 approach, we first have to find that driver node n d ∈ N D with out-degree equal to zero, or find a vertex
a function that obtains the set of child nodes corresponding to the out-degree of n d . In this way, we avoid violating OR2 after the link.
RR3
If u is a U-2 and the restoration strategy follows the APPR-2 approach, we first have to find that driver node n d bl of a given backup list with outdegree equal to one (pointing out to itself), or find a n d bl in the backup list of out-degree d ≥ 2 such that the |children(
Restoration of Structural Controllability
The three restoration rules given in Section 2.1 are the basic constraints to address the following three restoration strategies:
STG-2 Parametrisation using the network diameter and APPR-1.
STG-3 A backup list of driver nodes through APPR-2.
These three algorithms are developed and analysed in this section, considering in addition, the parameters and functions described above.
STG-1: Restoration Algorithm and Analysis
For any attack scenario (SCN-1, SCN-2), the approach consists of finding those candidates ∈ N D that can provide coverage to each vertex contained in U through a new edge. This approach is depicted in Algorithm 2.1, where the symbol ( ) is an indication for the complexity analysis given in Section 4. We now briefly outline the semantics of Algorithm 2.1. For each unobserved node, we verify whether it is part of N D . If a vertex u ∈ U is a n d by itself (U-1), then it is not necessary to find a member of N D to establish the link because such a node observes itself, satisfying the first restoration condition (RR1) given in Section 2.2. Otherwise, we randomly choose a non-attacked n d to proceed with link restoration. However, as this new link can change the power-law distribution given in G(V, E), we only choose those candidates with the highest in-degree (≥ 0) so as not to skew the degree distribution, effectively obtaining a preferential attachment process [15] . From these candidates, we select those that do not produce cycles after the attachment in order to comply with the second assumption given in Section 2.2.
Regardless the type of restoration strategy (STG-1, STG-2, STG-3) and the state of U , the verification of the existence of nodes in G(V, E) that violate OR2 after a perturbation is always required. To be more concise, we reduce the analysis to a subset of nodes instead of the entire graph, being this subset of nodes those related to the set of A. Moreover, depending on the target (TG) attacked, the analysis can vary:
TG-1 A n d has been attacked, so OR2 is performed for each n d in A. However, the verification process is only effective for scenarios SCN-1 in which the state of each child of an affected node has to be evaluated. This process is disrupted when there exists a
TG-2 A node v ∈ O has been attacked, so OR2 is applied for each v ∈ A. However, the analysis is only effective for SCN-1 where the algorithm is applied to those father nodes n d f v related to v and n d f v ∈ N D . As TG-1, the proof may be interrupted when there is a n d f v of degree ≥ 2 with
The set of driver fathers is obtained through the function fathers(v) corresponding to the in-degree of v.
As stated in Algorithm 3.2, the breach of OR2 involves an update of N D and the execution of Algorithm OR2, which is detailed in [4] . On the other hand, the correctness proof for STG-1 is by induction:
Postcondition U = , and OR1 and OR2 are fulfilled.
Case 1 U = after perturbation (SCN-1 or SCN-2) . Although the loop (while) of Algorithm 2.1 is not processed, Algorithm 3.2 must be executed to verify the fulfilment of OR2. Depending on the attack scenario, the resolution of Algorithm 3.2 changes. For scenarios SCN-1, the loops for the sets attacked N D and attacked O must be launched to detect the existence of one driver node (∈ attacked N D ) or parent drivers (∈ attacked O) that will violate the second controllability rule. In contrast, such sets are not considered for SCN-2 scenarios because the affected nodes are completely isolated, without children and parent vertices, satisfying OR2 through out degree = 0.
Case 2 U = after perturbation, being | U |= 1. In these circumstances, two cases must be distinguished:
it is necessary to explore the existence of one or several candidates {n d1 , . . . , n dn } with maximum in-degree (≥ 0) and with the capability to cover u without producing cycles and complying with RR2.
If this is the case, we ensure that ∃ a n d ∈ N D for coverage, and u therefore becomes part of O, guaranteeing that U is null for next iteration. If not, N D is updated with N D ∪ {u} to be observed at least by itself, where U = in the next iteration. However, this updating involves performing a verification process of OR2 [4] to determine the observation degree of the entire network after the loop of Algorithm 2.1.
Induction Assuming we are in step k (k > 1) with U = , k =| U | and | N D |≥ 1, we randomly select a node u ∈ U in each iteration of the while. When selecting a node, two cases can arise depending on u (U-1 or U-2), which pursue the same goals as Case 2 (but with | U |> 1). At the end of Algorithm 2.1, the set U and k are always updated through U = U \ {u} (see Case 2). In the next state, with k − 1, the procedure adopted is still valid, which means that the postcondition U = is not met and the loop must be run again for the next state k until k = 0. When k = 0, Case 1 occurs, and therefore the postcondition is true and Algorithm 2.1 terminates.
STG-2: Restoration Algorithm and Analysis
One extension of STG-1 is to consider the network diameter as Algorithm 3.3 describes. By induction, we expand the proof of STG-1 taking into account the initial and final conditions and base cases. For each iteration k (k > 1) with U = and | N D |≥ 1, we randomly select a node u ∈ U . As for the previous proof, we distinguish two types of affected nodes. If the node is U-1, then RR1 is still satisfied. However, if the node is U-2, then ∀ n d ∈ N D − A we select nodes with the minimum diameter that ensure acyclic graphs after repair. As the graph is unweighted, we considered the breadth-first search (BFS) method to obtain a list of nodes together with their diameters, and through this list we obtain those n d with minimum diameter (≥ 0) with respect to the entire graph.
In the case where there does not exist a candidate node satisfying all constraints for coverage, the unobserved node becomes part of the N D to guarantee at least OR1; otherwise the induction-based proof of STG-1 can be employed. At the end of the loop, the precondition | U |= k is updated in each stage k by computing U = U \ {u} until k = 0. As the proof of STG-1, the postcondition is true and Algorithm 3.3 terminates when Case 1, as defined in STG-1, is finally reached.
STG-3: Restoration Algorithm and Analysis
This strategy requires an initial pre-processing before commissioning to generate backup instances composed of driver nodes ∈ G(V, E). These instances have to be organised into a tree-like structure based on the concept of nice tree decomposition. To do this, a previous construction of a tree decomposition must be built, taking into account the network diameter to later be transformed into a nice tree decomposition. A tree decomposition is a tree T of G(V, E) with I nodes, where each node in T is a bag containing a set of n d ⊆ N D satisfying the following properties [7] :
Property 3 : ∀ bag i , bag j , bag z ∈ T , if bag j is on the path from bag i to bag z in T then bag i ∩ bag z ⊆ bag j .
The tree width corresponds to the minimum width w over all tree decompositions of G(V, E), where w = max i∈I (| bag i |∈ T ) − 1 where w ≥ 1. This means that a tree decomposition T of width w with | N D | driver nodes can be turned into a nice tree decomposition of width w, but subject to the diameter associated with each driver node within the network [16] . In this way, bags containing driver nodes with smaller diameters are located in the leaves of T , whilst driver nodes with higher diameters are located closer to the root.
A search bottom-up fashion, complying RR3;
For transformation to a nice tree decomposition, each node i of the tree T has at most two children (j, z) complying with two further conditions: Nodes with two children bag j and bag z , bag i = bag j = bag z (bag i as a join node); and nodes with a single child bag j such that bag i = bag j ∪ {n d } (bag i as an introduce node) or bag i = bag j − {n d } (bag i as a forget node). In practice, these trees are constructed using tables with at least three columns (i, j, z), where each entry i contains those subsets of n d in relation to i. However, this data structure also takes into account the maximum diameter associated with each bag since the approach does not focus on re-linking (APPR-1), the value of which remains constant throughout the restoration process. Therefore, the spatial overhead invested by such a table may become 3 × 2 w+1 = O(2 w+1 ) entries [17] . Algorithm 3.4 describes the behaviour of the restoration strategy with one or several nice tree decompositions T bk as the main input parameter with a storage cost of O( M bk=1 2 w+1 ). The idea is to process this parameter in a bottomup fashion to find those driver nodes with minimum diameter that ensure the fulfilment of RR3 stated in Section 2.2. By induction, we first define the initial and final conditions, and base cases:
Precondition A = with at least one T bkj with M ≥ j ≥ 1.
Case 1 Analogous to Case 1 of STG-1 in Section 3.1.
Case 2 U = after perturbation, being | U |= 1. As Case 2 of the proof of STG-1, two sub-cases are to be distinguished: (1) If u is U-1, the condition RR1 is satisfied. (2) If u is U-2, Algorithm 3.4 needs to traverse all trees T bkj from the bottom to locate those bags in T bkj containing the best driver candidates to cover u. This process means verifying the existence of a n d bl ∈ bags i −A such that (n d bl , u) ∈ E with minimum diameter in which RR3 is fulfilled. During this process, we also explore if such a n d bl belongs to N D to avoid increasing N D . If so, the set S 1 is updated through S 1 ∪ {n d bl }; otherwise the updating is for S 2 . In the case where S 1 = , we ensure that u is covered by at least one member in N D and the set O is updated, guaranteeing that U is empty in the next iteration. In contrast, if there is no perfect candidate (as above) in N D and S2 = , we also guarantee the existence of a n d bl ∈ T bkj with the ability to cover u, and hence O = O ∪ {u} and U = for the next iteration. However, N D must be updated with N D ∪ {n d bl }, requiring Algorithm 3.4 to verify the observation degree of the entire network when the loop finishes. This verification process, described in detail in Section 3.1, may also be performed when there is no perfect candidate (S 1 = and S 2 = ) to cover u. In this case, u becomes part of N D to comply with OR1, and hence U = in the next iteration. When U = and the rule OR2 is satisfied, the postcondition is true.
Induction In step k (k > 1) with U = , k =| U | and | N D |≥ 1, we randomly select a node u ∈ U in each iteration of the loop. When selecting a node, two situations can occur depending on u: U-1 or U-2, and both following the same goals set out for Case 2 (of this proof) but with | U |> 1. At the end of the algorithm, the set U and k are always updated through U = U \ {u}. In the next state, with k − 1, the procedure adopted is still valid, which means that the postcondition U = is not met and the loop must be run up again for the next state k until k = 0. When this happens, Case 1 of proof STG-1 must be verified to conclude that the postcondition is true, and therefore Algorithm 3.4 finishes.
Complexity Analysis and Discussion
We now briefly give an analysis of computational complexity, which must be performed for three restoration Algorithms STG-1, STG-2 and STG-3. For the former, processing the entire U set k times where k =| U | is required. For these k iterations, the algorithm must also find those best candidates ∈ N D − A with the highest in-degree to ensure the fulfilment of RR2 in the best scenario, or increase N D , at least, by one unit in the worst case.
For simplicity, we denote | V |= n, | E |= e, | A |= a (= 1), | N D |= nd and f = f athers(n d ); and we study the upper bound for SCN-1 and SCN-2.
To evaluate the worst scenario of each SCN-x (x = {1, 2}), we assume that nd ≈ n and the adversarial scenario is non-interactive (a single target TGx (x = {1, 2})), so that if A ⊆ N D , then nd − a ≈ n as well. In addition, we must also select the longest trace of Algorithm 2.1 that includes Algorithm 3.2, following the indication given by -note that both the assignment and if instructions have constant complexity O(i) and can be neglected). To address this aspect, we first evaluate the upper bound needed to find those non-attacked driver nodes (N D − A) with maximum in-degree (≥ 0) that satisfy the directed acyclic test after repair and RR2. The computation time of all of this process may become O(kn 2 ) if nd ≈ n. Depending on SCN-x and the targeted node TG-x, the computational complexity of Algorithm 3.2 can become variable as described in Section 3.1. Namely,
• TG-1 in SCN-1: In this case, it is necessary to verify OR2 for each attacked driver node ∈ attacked N D with a cost of O(a + e). As we are evaluating the worst scenario, we must observe that after computing the entire ∈ attacked N D , there exists a n d that infringes OR2, which forces Algorithm 3.2 to compute Algorithm OR2 given in [4] with an overhead of O(nd(nd + e)) = O(n 2 ). Therefore, the total complexity invested for this scenario is O(kn 2 + ((a + e) + n 2 )) = O(kn 2 ).
• TG-1 in SCN-2: The verification of OR2 is not possible because of the complete isolation of the nodes ∈ attacked N D ; hence O(kn 2 + (a + e)) = O(kn 2 ).
• TG-2 in SCN-1: This attack scenario requires Algorithm 3.2 to explore the existence of a parent n d f v related to v ∈ attacked O that does not comply with OR2. This may entail an upper bound of O(kn 2 + (a(f + e) + n 2 )) = O(kn 2 ).
• TG-2 in SCN-2: Similar to TG-1 in SCN-2.
The extension of N D can be influenced according to:
• TG-x in SCN-1: An increase of at least two new n d in N D .
• TG-x in SCN-2: An increase of one unit in N D in the worst case.
The computational cost of Algorithm STG-2 becomes analogous to the restoration strategy STG-1, but this time considering the overhead invested by the BFS method (O(n+e)) to compute the diameter of the entire network. Once we have obtained the list with diameter values, we extract those driver nodes related to N D − A so as to validate them with an acyclicity test (O((nd − a)(n + e)) = O(n 2 )); and in this way to later obtain the driver nodes with the highest in-degree (O(nd − a) = O(n)) and complying with RR2 (O((nd − a) + e) = 
O(n+e)). The overhead of this first part is so far O(k((n+e)+n 2 +n+(n+e))) = O(kn 2 ) if nd ≈ n. The rest of the analysis follows the same steps as for SCN-x and TG-x stated above, with the results summarised in Table 1 .
Regarding strategy STG-3, we simplify the study considering b = w +1 (the largest bag in T bkj ), and the worst case with n d ≈ n. To compute a bag bag i of T bkj with j ≤ M , Algorithm 3.4 must identify the existence of a n d bl that complies with RR3, which gives a cost of O(b+e). To obtain the best candidates of each backup instance T bkj stored in memory, the algorithm needs to process each tree with a computational cost of O( M bk=1 2 w+1 (b + e)). The second part of the approach follows the same studies described above for Algorithm 3.2, which are also summarised below and in Table 1 :
(2 w+1 (b + e)))), where N D increases its value at least in two nodes in the worst case.
•
(b + e)))), where N D increases its value at least in one node.
Therefore, the computational cost of STG-3 depends on the width w + 1 of T bkj , the cost of which can become undesirable for critical scenarios where the control needs to be resolved in linear time. However, this study concentrates on the worst cases where nd ≈ n, without considering the ability of this approach to prepare each backup instance using the diameter in the best cases. Similarly, STG-1 can also be an inadequate strategy with respect to STG-2 as the diameter computed in STG-2 benefits the fulfilment of RR2 (out degree = 0), reducing computational costs and the expansion of N D in each iteration. On the other hand, STG-1 and STG-2 have to transverse the entire network to search for the best candidates that satisfy conditions RR1 and RR2 (explicitly taking into account non-locality); whilst STG-3 must go over each backup instance to obtain the best candidates that satisfy condition RR3. Nevertheless, the dynamic computation of the diameter in STG-2 again highlights the benefit of this strategy to mitigate the non-locality problem of PDS inherent in these strategies by pre-computation.
On the other hand, we have implemented the three strategies over a powerlaw distribution known as PLOD in [18] , and analysed in [4] . The developments are based on Matlab with a low connectivity probability to produce a more realistic critical scenario with sparse distributions, using in this case y α with α = 0.2, and networks with medium (≤ 1000) and large (≤ 3100) number of nodes. For each network produced, we have analysed the resulting effect that can cause an attack of the type SCN-1 and SCN-2 in one arbitrary node (either a TG-1 or a TG-2) or in a subset of 'nodes/2 ' arbitrary nodes, the nodes of which can be either a TG-1 or a TG-2. The results of these simulations are shown in Table 2 , which depicts the efficiency of the three strategies regarding the changes caused on the size of N D after perturbation. We can deduce from this table that the variation of the set of driver nodes does not become significant with respect to the number of attacked nodes; in addition to underlining that 99% of the observation rate (with nodes of the type U-1 or U-2) were completely lost for all cases after perturbation. Despite this, we also observed that the networks were equally able to retake 100% the control after recovery without significant changes in the majority of the cases; and more particularly for STG-2, thanks in part to the use of the diameter.
The main contributions of this paper therefore have been three repair strategies for controllability in control graphs using the structural controllability abstraction, and relying on the Power Dominating Set formulation to gain a clearer understanding of above all, the effects of topology constraints on these types of repair strategies. These have included re-linking without restrictions, re-linking with constrained network diameter, and the use of pre-computed instances of driver nodes. In this way, controllability power-law networks can be restored more efficiently than by re-computing the controlling nodes when their links have been perturbed by attacks against the availability. The three strategies have been analysed formally and subjected to a complexity analysis. The results highlight that the use of a network diameter can be a suitable option to establish the control at a low computational and storage cost.
As future work, we are interested in extending this analysis to explore the possibility of restoring control subgraphs rather than the entire network whilst retaining acceptable control graph parameters (primarily in the number of nodes, maximum out-degree, and diameter), thereby improving the respective approaches and their complexity. We remain particularly interested in powerlaw networks and seek to optimise approximation mechanisms for controllability that give satisfactory average-time complexity. Moreover, we will also investigate further attack models, particularly where interactions between attackers and defenders occur.
